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THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

DEWEY'S ESTHETIC THEORY. I

THE EARLIER THEORY

THE esthetic problem is a crucial philosophical problem. It has not always been so treated; it has too often been a hasty addendum to a system or a corroboration, plausible or fanciful, of a general philosophical position. Failure to do better by an experience that pervades and enlivens ordinary experience and that is perhaps the most arresting of special experiences has left a gap in philosophical theory, and has deprived life at this point of the support of thought. When the poets, moved by the beauty of nature, have sung of

> that blessed mood,
> In which the burden of the mystery,
> In which the heavy and the weary weight,
> Of all this unintelligible world is lightened,

they have challenged the philosophers not to neglect what it is that is revealed in "the mighty world of eye and ear." Though Keats' conviction that "Beauty is truth, truth, beauty" offers us a riddle rather than a problem, still it is not one of those riddles that should "tease us out of thought"; it should stimulate thought. As "a wild surmise" it has agitated but not provoked thought. Has Dewey readjusted the too usual philosophical attitude toward esthetic experience? Has he turned a direct and persistent, not an indirect and casual, attention to "the language of the sense"? Yes and no. Yes—when he eagerly explores art and follows the steps of the artist to see what he is about. No—when in a traditional fashion he absorbs it in his metaphysical conclusions. Like many others he then reduces the data of the esthetic problem to conformity with an already formed general view of life. Zealous on behalf of recent forms of art he does not employ the method of reducing art to another form of life, but the more "honorific" transformation of all life that is life into art, of all experience that is "*an* experience" into art. Art enthusiasts have often praised art in just this fashion; life, they have said time and again, should perfect itself in the spirit of art, life should itself be a work of art. Dewey has his own version of art and the perfect life. But whether art merely serves the rest of life or becomes all that is best in life, the data of the esthetic problem are destroyed, not elicited and interpreted. Art is denied

special character. When Dewey concerns himself specifically with art, with what is added to "ordinary" life by a work of art, he contributes immensely to esthetic theory. The poetic quotations at the beginning of the paragraph were not there as introductory decorative matter. They point the way to what Dewey has done, for he has shown how sense developed, integrated, becomes the meaningful experience that is esthetic experience. Especially in two chapters in *Art as Experience*[1]—"The Common Substance of the Arts" and "The Varied Substance of the Arts"—he so interprets "the language of the sense" that he tells us the language it speaks.

The esthetic theory made out of his general point of view (what might be called his metaphysics of art) is reached thus: the transformation of means into end increases value in life and thus reveals the ideal value,—the *amalgamation* of means and end: in art there is to be found this ideal transformation, and thus art is an example of perfection and is moreover that which all forms of life become when perfect. The other theory, fully developed in *Art as Experience*, is based on a search through life and through art for what happens when sense experience, what is present to eye and ear, takes on increasing importance. Why, he asks, is it not a miracle but comprehensible that great artists can make the sensuous world in its way all important? The two theories do not conflict for they have little to do with each other. With great skill he occasionally incorporates the first verbally into his argument for the other.

An earlier work, *Experience and Nature*,[2] in chapters not directly concerned with art, frequently refers to the esthetic problem and gives hints as to a possible solution. There seemed to be a promise of an account of art that would give it special character—despite Dewey's besetting fear that to distinguish from is to separate from the rest of life. But when the special topic of art is reached in Chapter IX, certain red herrings get across the trail,—social injustice, class distinctions, the ever lurking honorific or invidious intentions of apparently innocent conceptual distinctions. In defence of the oneness of life, which he finds always challenged, with amazing dialectical skill he makes the different into the identical. He reiterates his conviction that art is not distinctive except as perhaps it provides an especially transparent and persuasive illustration of what *everything* good essentially is, of what *all* human activity achieves, of what *all* life ought to be. He attacks society past and present—it has prevented the good life; and all thought by subtle devices has deceived us as to the nature of the good life,—

[1] John Dewey: *Art as Experience.* New York: Minton, Balch & Co. 1934.

[2] *Experience and Nature,* New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc. 1929. All references throughout the first part of this article, "The Earlier Theory," are to this work.

at times self-deceived and again disingenuous and malign. The argument builds up a splendid eulogy of a better state of affairs. It develops an ethics and urges a social reform. But under the honors thrust upon it art is buried.

The argument takes this course. We should discard the customary general distinction between the arts, practice, practical activity, and speculative or theoretic activity as false to fact and the source of invidious distinctions. Dewey is true to the implications of pragmatism in finding in such intellectual distinctions a motive, and he pays heed to one strain in modern psychology in disclosing that the motive wears a disguise. The Greeks saw the difference between practical and intellectual activities as one of degrees of worth, labor a necessity of our needs, of the partial and humble aspects of our nature, thought the assertion of our power to envisage the universal. In practice we acknowledge dependence and incompleteness; in theory we display our freedom, lay hold on perfection; wherefore the Greeks looked down upon practice, the arts, and honored science, theory. The one is the drudgery of life, the other the highest form of enjoyment. The simple and absolute antithesis here expressed is rather a melodramatic than a realistic rendering of the Greek attitude. At any rate it provides for Dewey a properly social impetus toward a theory of art,—the theory that art occurs in the coalescence of the two aspects of life. Modern thought does not bestow its honors so unhesitatingly as did the Greeks. Consistently with their whole manner of life they could place contemplation, the self-sufficient mood of thought, above production, the labor that is servant to our needs. But we honor labor; modern thought demands more of man than passive enjoyment and its demands are not exactions merely but a new form of praise. In that contemplation is merely passive and production active, only the latter creates, has the *power* that we admire. The general contrast between production of changes in the world and mere inspection before and after change is present in the special region of art; by the modern sense of values it is the artist who produces that is honored, not the man of taste who merely enjoys or possesses. Furthermore, when distinctions are made among works of art, the modern tendency is to applaud the new, the novel, the additional. The vagaries of merely capricious impulse might, Dewey thinks, give us pause; they may and should persuade us to a profounder insight and lead us to see in the work of art the drawing together of the novel and the routine, the fusion of "the basic uniformities of nature" with "the wonder of the new and the grace of the gratuitous."

To recapitulate: practise and thought offer a contrast that led the Greeks to prefer thought to practise but that leads us to prefer

practise to thought. In art there is that which destroys the basis of both preferences. Reflection on what we value in art should make us dispute both the Greek and our own choice. In art thought and practise blend.

> Thought, intelligence, science is the intentional direction of natural events to meanings capable of immediate possession and enjoyment; this direction—which is operative art—is itself a natural event in which nature otherwise partial and incomplete comes fully to itself; so that objects of conscious experience when reflectively chosen, form the "end" of nature. The doings and sufferings that form experience are, in the degree in which experience is intelligent or charged with meanings, a union of the precarious, novel, irregular with the settled, assured, and uniform. . . . Wherever there is art the contingent and ongoing no longer work at cross purposes with the formal and recurrent but commingle in harmony. [*Experience and Nature*, pp. 358–359.]

What is true of all properly conscious experience—that in it "the instrumental and the final, meanings that are signs and clues and meanings that are immediately possessed, suffered and enjoyed, come together in one"—is "preëminently true of art." Though another notion lurks beneath, art here develops "meaning" in what it presents and thus raises the value of experience. Taken simply this is what Plato half thought when he saw beauty as perhaps embodiment of Idea; and is what Hegel has said. In the account of art as a creative activity, overcoming dualities to compound the novel with the familiar, the "ongoing" with the formed, it is closely related to Nietzsche. These resemblances are, of course, far-fetched if "meaning" retains for Dewey a plainly instrumental function, but whether or not it always in this connection does is ambiguous. Dewey acknowledges that the special virtues of art have been "truly declared" by certain systems of esthetic theory to be "a union of necessity and freedom, a harmony of the many and one, a reconciliation of the sensuous and the ideal"; but that the understanding of art was thus increased need not be acknowledged, for these systems were "without empirical basis and import in their words." Thus Dewey formally phrases his impression that the philosophers with whom he may seem to agree did not sufficiently know what they were talking about. It might be conceded that they did not bring their thought so to bear on art and esthetic experience as to make it clearly enough reveal, certainly not to modern eyes, what is happening there; and that especially in parts of *Art as Experience* Dewey moves closer to the actual scene. His is a fresh realization and a differently argued proof. Such statements as the following have a new ring.

> Art is solvent union of the generic, recurrent, ordered, established phase of nature with its phase that is incomplete, going on, and hence still uncertain, contingent, novel, particular. . . . Of any artistic act and product it may be said both that it is inevitable in its rightness, that nothing in it can be altered

> without altering all, and that its occurrence is spontaneous, unexpected, fresh, unpredictable. The presence in art, whether as an act or a product, of proportion, economy, order, symmetry, composition, is such a commonplace that it does not need to be dwelt upon. But equally necessary is unexpected combination, and the consequent revelation of possibilities hitherto unrealized. . . . The "magic" of poetry—and pregnant experience has poetic quality—is precisely the revelation of meaning in the old effected by its presentation through the new. It radiates the light that never was on land and sea but that is henceforth an abiding illumination of objects. Music in its immediate occurrence is the most various and etherial of the arts, but in its conditions and structure the most mechanical. [*Loc. cit.*, pp. 359–360.]

There is no need, Dewey thinks, to apologize for these commonplaces, till "their evidential significance for a theory of nature's nature" is commonly recognized.

In *Experience and Nature* Dewey is distracted from the emerging possibilities of sense as the medium of meanings by his theory of means-end amalgamation, by what he conceives to be the method of art and an ideal of method—a method that is perfect in that it relates means and end absolutely and so guarantees not merely eventual success but success all along the way. Value is a kind of transcendent efficacy. This strand in Dewey's thought has been criticized often enough, but it can not be omitted from a discussion of his esthetic theory. It is art viewed as an amalgamation of means and end that supports his conviction that art is the ideal of life, is any experience that is what experience ought to be, is what all life must become. He turns from art as art to art as social improvement, as the social millennium. Reviewing the conceptions that have emerged from his analysis of art he sees their wider and entrancing possibilities; these conceptions are those of labor and contemplation, of effort and enjoyment, of uniformities and novelties; plainly art has a far wider than its special meaning. The argument must expand beyond the apparent range of the topic. Dewey's phrasing here characterizes with unintentional accuracy the nature of this argument: he writes, "the theme *has insensibly passed over* into that of the relation of means and consequence, process and product, the instrumental and the consummatory. Any activity that is simultaneously both, rather than in alternation and displacement, is art" (italics not in text). The substance of what follows becomes primarily moral admonition and ethical theory: all life *ought* to consist of activities simultaneously instrumental and consummatory, what *is* so is therein good, what is rather one than the other is thereby bad. The Greeks had perhaps greater intellectual consistency and an easier conscience when, feeling free to do so, they commended and preferred the life of contemplative enjoyment. We "know better," but do not put our knowledge frankly into effect. We seek comfort for the con-

sequent inconsistencies in our thought or for its violation in our practise—placate the toiler and our democratic consciences—by the plea of necessity and the convention of eulogistic question-begging epithets. Impatient with our toleration of toil that is far from enjoyable, Dewey asks us not to obscure the issue by calling such toil useful and necessary. "We optimistically call much of our labors in home, factory, laboratory, and study useful and let it go at that, thinking that by calling them useful we have somehow justified and explained their occurrence." The only permissible form of usefulness is that which serves human needs. What is the use of shoes if the toiler in the factory lives a "narrowed, embittered, and crippled life"? The human need for "possession and appreciation of the meaning of things" is "ignored and unsatisfied in the traditional notion of the useful."

Our classificatory use of the conception of some arts as merely instrumental so as to dispose of a large part of human activity is no solving definition; it rather conveys an immense and urgent problem. [*Loc. cit.*, pp. 362–363.]

The question is how to dispose of the distinction on which it rests so that all activities shall be consummatory—or still better at once consummatory and instrumental. Art is the answer. Art in the proper sense transcends the obstructing distinctions,—centrally that between means and end; in it "meanings that are signs and clues and meanings that are immediately possessed, suffered, and enjoyed, come together in one." That all life may be immediately enjoyable, all life should be art for in art all means are parts of the end and an end is a means to a further end. This is the condition of continuous immediate enjoyment and of increasing enjoyments. Only wicked or stupid habits of thought preserving unreal distinctions prevent this consummation, prevent perfection. The feasibility of perfection all turns on conceiving the processes of which the work of art is the outcome as its ingredients, and therefore as equally with it enjoyable. An alternate talent for the perfect life is the power to love the processes toward a desired result equally with it once we know their relation to it. Now it is true that many of the experiences that lead into an appreciation or into the production of a work of art are retained in one's experience of it, are ingredients in the culminating experience, but many are preparatory only however well we recognize their relation to the outcome. But for the hoped-for result they would not be undertaken at all. I doubt if the life of the artist has fewer of these recalcitrant processes than that of others. Its necessary toils are often willingly undergone and so irradiated by their end, but they are not, as Dewey would have it, all loved. It's a strange insistence on absolute acceptability all along any route. The proof of its possibility is simply that of arbitrary definition;

Dewey bluntly refuses to call means, means, unless they are also ends, or indeed to call ends, ends, unless they are also means to further ends. (All other means are "pseudo-means.") But that is to obliterate the distinction on which rests the movement of his argument and from which also arises the motivation of the practical situation in which he is interested. For let the means become ends and, as has happened, instead of only thereby being means they may cease to be means and beguile us from the end they were to have served; a task that serves a desired end may indeed not merely reconcile us to it, it may even come to have too great an attraction of its own. Some means have no such dangerous attractiveness. Our study of French irregular verbs is a price we willingly pay for our enjoyment of French literature, but we do not think it a part of what we are paying for. The work of art, for Dewey the ideal illustration of the amalgamation of means and ends, does not contain as ingredients, or parts, the preceding technical processes. In a manner of speaking, yes, perhaps, but seriously speaking, no. If Dewey refers only to the preceding imaginative experiences that are present in it, assent is easy, but such a limitation of his meaning ignores his demand that *all* instrumental activities shall be ingredients in their end and equally with it acceptable.

Dewey seems to feel that the formula, the amalgamation of means and end, by defining a perfect state of affairs makes it attainable. When we know that means are never means except as they take on the desirability of their end, we will see that pseudo-means, not being means, are futile, and we will no longer permit toil and drudgery. A work of art amalgamates means and end, it proves the possibility of the ideal, and presents a suggestive and stimulating image of perfection. If we pay heed to it life will become what it ought to be, all life will be the life of art. Not raising the question of the general application of the means-end formula to the nature and conditions of human effort, one asks, is an amalgamation of the instrumental and the consummatory or even a relatively close approach to it present in the life of art? Does "every process of free art prove that the difference between means and end is analytical, formal, not material and chronological"? The artist would hardly agree that all his efforts are literally parts of his goal (except as he agrees to play the game of speaking in that way). Dewey would retort in the terms of his definition of art—only that can be called art in which the means and the end do coalesce.

In the following passage *meaning* is evidently nothing more than a reference to means or to ends. A work of art "means" for the spectator primarily past processes, for the artist primarily future results.

> What has been said enables us to redefine the distinction drawn between the artistic, as objectively productive, and the esthetic [the artistic he uses to refer to the experience of the artist, the esthetic to the enjoyment of art by men in general.] Both involve a perception of meanings in which the instrumental and the consummatory peculiarly intersect. In esthetic perceptions an object interpenetrated with meanings is given; it may be taken for granted; it invites and awaits the act of appropriative enjoyment. In the esthetic object tendencies are sensed as brought to fruition; in it is embodied a means-consequence relationship, as the past work of his hands was surveyed by the Lord and pronounced good. . . . Artistic sense on the other hand grasps tendencies as possibilities; the invitation of these possibilities to perception is more urgent and compelling than that of the given already achieved. While the means-consequence relationship is directly sensed, felt, in both appreciation and artistic production, in the former the scale descends on the side of the attained; in the latter there predominates the invitation of an existent consummation to bring into existence further perceptions. [*Loc. cit.*, pp. 374–375.]

Conversely any activity in which "meaning" transforms means into ends is art.

> Thinking is preëminently an art; knowledge and propositions which are the products of thinking, are works of art, as much so as statuary and symphonies, [for]every successive stage of thinking is a conclusion in which the meaning of what has produced it is condensed; and it is no sooner stated than it is a light radiating to other things—unless it be a fog that obscures them. The antecedents of a conclusion are as causal and existential as those of a building. They are not logical or dialectical, or an affair of ideas. . . . Scientific method or the art of constructing true perceptions is ascertained in the course of experience to occupy a privileged position in undertaking other arts. But this unique position only places it the more securely as an art; it does not set its product, knowledge, apart from other works of art. [*Loc. cit.*, pp. 378–379.]

Meaning as defined above is a recognition of tendencies fulfilled or a recognition of the means toward further ends. As a symbol of successful desire whatever is so viewed is always to be embraced. Causal conditions do not impose themselves on us as necessary means, for they *are* means only when they "mean" their ends, when they are "freely used because of perceived connection with chosen consequences." The "freely" surely begs the question. Taken simply it means that we choose the causal conditions freely in the sense of deliberately, as recognized means to a chosen end; if we want the end we must needs take these means. Such a choice is however free just because compelled by our free choice of the end; the means are not in themselves a free choice. Life is full of distasteful means realized and chosen exactly as such; but for their "meaning" they would not be chosen in any sense, and our hope about them is not that they shall become ingredients in the end, but rather that they shall leave no after-taste. The necessary means *may* have their own appeal, or they *may* borrow appeal from their ends. But Dewey's

optimism puts a strain on even the most well-disposed toward life. It promises if not exactly a new heaven—it has marked if obscured similarities with others—certainly a new earth. All our ends we may, he thinks, pursue under idyllic conditions, for we can love the route toward them as much as we love the goal. "To entertain, choose, and accomplish anything as an end or consequence is to be committed to a like love and care for whatever events and acts are its means."[3] Though in many cases this may be happily so, yet it varies with temperament and with brute fact.

When Dewey faces social injustice he must believe that toil is unnecessary, that drudgery must be not merely reduced and shared but eliminated. He is strangely compelled by his hatred of unjustly distributed labor to undertake to disprove the necessity for any form of toil. Had his account of the work of art, into which skill, and paint, and tones, etc., enter, as he puts it, as ingredients, faced the plain facts of how they come so to enter, the process of art would serve less well as a sample of absolute acceptability, of the coalescence of the instrumental and the consummatory. What he calls elements, in the whole that is the final work of art, have been made so by past and present effort on the part of artist and spectator; and the artist's attempt to master his material, to conceive his subject, our attempts to get what the artist presents, are often toilsome and are often accompanied by fear that they may lead nowhere—or to some worse place. We may well wish to do away with the gap between means and ends, or always to possess guaranteed means, but in the first desire, we ask for Arcadia where not only the weary but everyone else can only be at rest, and in the second we demand only mechanical perfection. In the attempt to make "meaning" "perfectly" productive, he has made it "perfectly" mechanical. The perfect amalgamation of means and end destroys the active and desiring being in whose interest it has been invoked.

Throughout Dewey puts forward meaning as a value peculiarly present in art. In the means-end theory meaning has efficiency value, is a reference of means to their ends, and of ends to their means. But in many of his descriptions of its presence in a work of art, descriptions which retain the instrumental-consummatory value theory, it has an additional character; it is the presence in the work of art of preceding processes but it is also the presence of "character" and "distinction." In the following quotation the first version of meaning is stated, the second added: "consequences belong integrally to the conditions which produce them, *and* the latter possess *character and distinction*"[4] (italics not in text). It

[3] *Loc. cit.*, pp. 366–367.

[4] *Loc. cit.*, p. 371.

is on the notions of "character" and "distinction," the defined in perception, that Dewey builds what seems to me the important and brilliant account of the nature of art that gives *Art as Experience* much greater interest than his attempts to prove that esthetic value is pragmatic, indeed superpragmatic, value. In the following statement the values of meaning as imaginative grasp and as instrumental efficacy are both recognized, the latter as conditioning the former: "*It is marked out in perception, distinguished by* the efficacy of the conditions which have entered into it"[5] (italics not in text). In the following there is the suggestion that meaning realized is as such a value: "When appetite is perceived in its meanings . . . we live on the human plane, responding to things *in* their meanings."[6] In the following passage meanings are fruitions and also liberators of subsequent action, but even as instruments of further action what they fruitfully create is "more meanings and more perceptions."

> To be conscious of meanings or to have an idea, marks a fruition, an enjoyed or suffered arrest of the flux of events. But there are all kinds of ways of perceiving meanings, all kinds of ideas. Meaning may be determined in terms of consequences hastily snatched at and torn loose from their connections; then is prevented the formation of wider and more enduring ideas. Or, we may be aware of meanings, may achieve ideas, that unite wide and enduring scope with richness of distinctions. The latter sort of consciousness is more than a passing and superficial consummation or end; it takes up into itself meanings covering stretches of existence wrought into consistency. It marks the conclusion of long continued endeavor, of patient and indefatigable search and test. The idea is, in short, art and a work of art. As a work of art, it directly liberates subsequent action and makes it more fruitful in a creation of more meanings and more perceptions. [*Loc. cit.*, p. 371.]

Dewey has a habit of incorporating into a challenging statement something that blunts our objections if it does not exactly silence them. As in the above, meaning is important instrumentally *but* as instrumental toward more meaning and more perceptions, so in the following the means in the work of art are ends, *but* "in their present stage of realization." "The brick, stone, wood and mortar are means only as the end-in-view is actually incarnate in them, in forming them. Literally, they *are* the end in view in its present stage of realization."[7] In the phrases "in forming them," "in their present stage of realization," we have implications that deliberate action is what we know it as,—effort toward no guaranteed end, by means that are not part of the end. When Dewey views means as really ends, he moves us into a world in which our state of bliss would be that of Browning's duchess who "liked whate'er she looked

[5] *Loc. cit.*, p. 371.
[6] *Loc. cit.*, pp. 370–371.
[7] *Loc. cit.*, pp. 373–374.

at, and her looks went everywhere." In such a world it is not so much that effort may cease as that effort is quite out of place. But at moments Dewey can forget this version of perfection and fully acknowledge that there are present even in a work of art the usual conditions of human effort; in the creation of a work of art "the integration is progressive and experimental, not momentarily accomplished. Thus every creative effort is temporal, subject to risk and deflection."[8] Contrast with the statement previously quoted: "Every process of free art proves that the difference between means and end is analytic, formal, not material and chronological."[9]

Whenever he relaxes his hold on the notion of art as reconciliation of the instrumental and the consummatory, the question for Dewey becomes not what formula shall transform life into art, but just what art does to life when it enters into it. The means-end formula haunts the background of the argument, but the concern is to discover, to lay hold on and display the substance of art, to find a way through the treacherous terminology of esthetic theory to a specific theory of art. His conviction remains the same: any degree or form of distinction between means and end is to be done away with—but its connection with the esthetic theory developed is formal. Present verbally the old words stand in a new light. Art perfects life, it makes for life; experience that is *an* experience always has the qualities of art. Even in these ambiguous statements we glimpse for art freedom from the rigid means-end test. In his contributions to the journal of the Barnes Foundation and in *Art as Experience,* Dewey examines art with an enthusiasm and a discernment that should put new life into esthetic discussion. On some of the perennial issues of art theory and of art criticism (substance and form, art and morality, art and propaganda), he speaks with a mastery of the nature of the underlying confusions of thought and with a lucidity that should make it possible to bury these long-dead bones of contention.[10]

E. A. SHEARER.

SMITH COLLEGE.

[8] *Loc. cit.,* p. 376.
[9] *Loc. cit.,* p. 374.
[10] To be continued in next issue, No. 24.

THE RELATIONS OF PHYSICS AND BIOLOGY TO EPISTEMOLOGY

MY thesis is that epistemological discussion must orient itself primarily to biological fact, and not to physical fact as it does now. My text is a very fine little book called *Mind and Nature,* in which Hermann Weyl publishes the lectures he recently delivered at Swarthmore College. Weyl's topic is the relation of physical knowledge to its object, the physical world. He concludes that the subject and object of physical knowledge are not to be distinguished. "The world, the goal of our scientific endeavor, is not one existing in itself, but arises from and exists only by means of the meeting of the subject and object." Notice incidentally how a study of exclusively physical science is taken to define the relation of *all* science to nature!

Weyl is one of the two or three great physicists qualified by philosophical training to speak on epistemological problems. His exposition is masterly, his historical comment is penetrating. Yet his conclusion, in spite of all the physical and philosophical competence of the argument, is void of meaning. If the subject and object of physical science are indistinguishable, what is the meaning of an analysis which assumes their distinction and discusses their relation? The problem is shown to be a pseudo-problem, one that arises from false presuppositions which preclude successful analysis. Like the classical epistemologies of Locke, Hume, and Kant, of which it is the epigone, Weyl's little book serves only as a *reductio ad absurdum* of its own initial postulates. This would constitute a real advance, if others were persuaded by it to accept the reduction, and renounce the postulates.

Ever since Descartes, however, philosophers have been content to set up the postulates, and then knock them down again. What is wrong with the postulates, and what are the alternatives to them? Is it not apparent that if we are to discuss the subject-object relation, we must first distinguish subject and object by reference to something other than themselves? But our epistemology does not do this. It is precluded from doing so by its exclusive attention to physical science and the subject and object thereof. For subject and object are indissolubly integrate in the specific cognition. Epistemology really starts out from the naïve distinction of the human organism and its spatial environment; but it immediately abstracts from this richer context, calls the organism the subject and the environment the object, and places cognition in a vacuum. Where we draw the line between subject and object becomes now an arbitrary matter, so that some can call the subject what others call the

object. Small wonder no one reads epistemology save those who write it. We may recall that Greek thinkers avoided this pitfall by setting up several sorts of cognition, relatively independent of each other, in sensation, opinion, and reason. There is something to be said for an approach which did at least prevent the epistemological discussion from issuing in verbal nonsense.

The alternative to our bankrupt epistemology is suggested by the foregoing. Let us hold fast to that distinction between the human organism and its environment which gives to the subject-object distinction its whole real content! Instead of starting with contemporary physical science plus a meaningless subject-object dichotomy within it, and referring only incidentally to the complex of living activity which is the matrix of physical cognition, let us start with the living human process and regard physical investigation as one specification of this process! Let us make epistemology a branch of biology, instead of some sort of psycho-physics! Are we philosophers not ready yet, even now that the nineteenth century has come and gone, to attribute reality to living process? One can forgive the physicist, dedicated as he is from youth up to severely physical speculation, for identifying human knowledge with contemporary physical theory; but that is not excusable in you and me, brother-philosopher! We ought to be able by this time to break away from the narrow Cartesian dogma which holds that physical reality, together with its scientific cognition, constitutes an exhaustive analysis of nature. It is true that the dogma is continually resuscitated by new physical theories, which suggest a fictitious need of bringing the form of the dogma up-to-date. But the dogma has really been an anachronism since the revival in modern times of the empirical sciences of living behavior.

Why has not philosophy been able to transcend the dogma of the Cartesian physicism? One reason is that the sciences of life, unlike physics, have not yet achieved a definitive theoretical form; so that it is still possible to argue, with Descartes, that there are no such sciences. But that reason would not hold up against the actual presence with us of the biotic sciences if there did not stand, behind and supporting the Cartesian dogma, a still older dogma bequeathed to us through it. The scholastic dogma that man's reason is his essence, ostensibly renounced along with all the other essences three centuries ago, still weighs over us. It is what makes plausible the substitution, in our effete epistemology, of the relation of our most systematic knowledge to its object in physical reality for the whole relation of man to his natural environment. Out upon both dogmas! Man has other relations to nature besides that of physical enquiry. Man is not merely rational, nor is nature exhaustively physical.

Man builds, breeds, domesticates, loves, hates, governs, rebels, fights, eats, dies, thrives, pines, works, and plays; and all in many sorts. The problem of physical science, and of systematic enquiry in general, is correctly seen and indeed exists only when it is placed in this larger context covering the several relations of man to his world. Hume saw this, when he rooted the bases of thought in custom. Kant divined it, when he interpreted rational analysis as a specification of the moral sense. Pragmatists agree, when they understand science as the instrument of vital need. But none of these have done more than propose the conception of knowledge as an expression of the generic living process—or if they do propose more, they soon forget their objective, and are back in an analysis of the traditional sort, dominated by the Cartesian presuppositions.

It is time, God knows, to end our scholasticism, if we are to save philosophy from the philistines who would reduce all human aspiration to the baser animal urges. But how to do it? How present the structure of cognition as a specification of the more general structure of living activity, when we possess no definitive and adequate theory of living process? We could not explain chemical interactions as a specific form of electrical motion if we did not possess to begin with a fair knowledge of both chemical and electrical structure. Our logical analysis provides some insight perhaps into the structure of thought; but where is the relatively adequate biotic structure in terms of which this thought-structure is to be understood? We must admit that it does not yet exist. Biology has not yet advanced far enough to allow us to use its theory as the basis of a reconstruction of the higher cognitive processes. Yet without this biological basis, our epistemology is vain!

To those who have followed the argument thus far I therefore propose a really radical revolution in philosophy, a revolution not of doctrine, but of interest and objective. Instead of protracting the futile epistemology that has posed as philosophy from the time of Descartes down to our own day, let us devote our philosophical powers to the establishment of an adequate science of living behavior, in the insight that only when we have done this may we hope to phrase our epistemological problem in ways allowing its solution. The rest of this paper is devoted to an initial clarification of the nature of this study. It will show, however, that participation in this enterprise is the duty of the philosopher as well as his privilege and opportunity; for the prejudices preventing the construction of an adequate biology are the same as those which have confined us within a futile epistemology.

These prejudices arise out of the "physicism" imposed by Descartes on subsequent speculation. We must all revere Descartes as

the most influential metaphysician of modern times; but our reverence must not blind us to the fact that in clearing the way for modern physics, Descartes destroyed too much. The traditional philosophy, with its multiple essences and syllogistic logic, had to go, since it was incommensurate with mathematical physics and with modern dynamic science in general. But it was not necessary, in order to allow to physical analysis a universal extension and a status of scientific certainty, to wipe the slate of nature clean of life! The scholastic assumption of a hierarchy of essences is indeed irrelevant to the dynamic and particularistic assumptions of modern science; but the specific forms of animal and plant which were the empirical basis of the scholastic hierarchy are real and observable entities, and constitute the visible appearance of a natural structure which no comprehensive analysis may ignore. Their importance, that is to say their effective existence, is responsible for the appearance alongside the physical sciences of the biological and sociological sciences, sciences which resist inclusion in the physical system and which point rather to an evolutionary, genetic, historical dimension of nature that is incommensurable, and possibly incompatible, with the Cartesian metaphysic of a purely geometrical nature. We stand here with Plato of the *Timæus,* distinguishing a motion determined by geometrical regularities from a motion determined by specific form or Idea.

What we have to do is to transcend our Cartesian physicism at least to the degree that we can see in the organism, the herd or colony, the species, the polity, the cultural form, etc., entities as natural and as metaphysically real as the molecule, the light-wave, and the quantum. It is possible to insist, of course, that the *biotic* entities of the first group must eventually reduce to the *physical* entities of the second group; but this verbal insistence will have scientific meaning only when we understand the biotic entities in their place in a biotic structure described by biotic theory. Reducing molecular entities to electrical entities does not mean reducing molecules to electrons; it means understanding the known molecular reactions in terms of the structure of electronic motion; and to do this we must first know the laws of molecular activity as such. The popular mind will always confuse the motion which is thinking with the motions which are thought about. Not to do so is to philosophize. But we should be able to make plain to all that we do already recognize in nature a distinctive pattern of organic movement, a pattern which to some extent at least is intelligible in its own character without reduction to physical structure. We use this empirical knowledge of biotic nature in our daily dealings with each other, and in our control of animal and plant growth. Our first business is the

extension and organization into a systematic science of this more immediate knowledge of organic behavior.

But is not this what the biologist and psychologist already do, or have done? How is the philosopher to assist in such matters? No, the life-sciences have not yet succeeded in laying the foundations of a systematic science of living movement. Their material lies, like quarried granite, much as it was taken out of the perceptual terrain, and such theoretical blue-prints as they have concocted are fantastic or meaningless. They lack the fundamental concepts required for the foundation of a dynamic biology worthy to stand alongside our modern dynamic physics. Nor will they find them until there arise among them philosophers, whether these latter be trained in the laboratory or in the seminar. They are precluded from the consideration of such concepts by their present presuppositions, which only a philosopher can remove. How can a biologist proceed to the erection of an autonomous biology if he is initially convinced that systematic knowledge and physical science are one and the same thing? This is the deepest conviction of contemporary biologists, as it is of all moderns except the few emancipate; and it means that every clear distinction of organic character is a subjective illusion, to be rigorously abstracted from in the course of scientific analysis. The biologist can not begin, of course, with this rigorous abstraction from organic character, since it is this character which defines his distinctive study, and which gives him his right to be; but he abstracts from it as he proceeds, throwing aside the observable organic characters one by one, until he emerges empty-handed, all the organic characters it was his business to correlate and arrange having been discarded in the analysis. He is compelled to this suicidal behavior by his initial presupposition, which is that the organism, although itself organic enough and clearly distinguishable from its environment by way of this organic character, moves in and reacts to a physical world. Quite correctly the biologist endeavors to relate the organic movement to the environmental conditions occasioning it; but the environmental stimuli he looks for are physical, so that their effects, the responses to them, are necessarily physical too; and in this way the organic character is lost in a complex of physical reactions. The whole organic activity becomes a chemical osmosis, the organism becomes its skin.

Why does the biologist postulate a physical environment for the organism? Well, that is what everybody does, in this year of grace, who wants to be scientific. Our tradition demands that we define the world that lies about the organism in physical terminology. Does not modern science mean just this, that we displaced the gods from heaven and earth, and put in atoms? God forbid, for that is

only what science means to the modern fool; and if our whole tradition is the fool, all the quicker should we end it. What tradition has done is to confuse the method of physics with its content. We want to be scientific, like physics; but this does not mean that we must identify science with physics. Physical science is only one group among a diversity of analyses of nature, analyses that are equally modern, dynamic, and scientific. Let us recall a little history, to clear up the muddle!

Modern dynamic science arose as an alternative to the static analysis of earlier times. This earlier scholastic science explained the behavior of a thing via its essence, which was to explain it in terms of its supposed relation to the whole universe. The inadequacy of the scholastic analysis was most apparent in regard to astronomical movements; and when Copernicus left the sun swinging in the void, without intelligible relation to the universe of fixed stars, scholasticism was doomed. Henceforth things could not be explained by any reference to their position in a universe, they could be explained only in terms of their relations to each other. Galileo used this new sort of explanation in reviving the science of mechanics, and Newton used it, but with a very different set of relations, to explain the planetary motions. What Descartes did was to generalize the mechanistic method so that it might be applied to everything, and become a universal science. While Descartes did a good deal of violence to the physics of his day, his metaphysic has had enormous success, and is astonishingly verified in contemporary physics. We must recognize, however, that even in physics his conception of an exhaustively geometrical cosmos has to be supplemented by pluralistic theories of energy. But let us emphasize here only what distinguishes this Galilean or Cartesian conception of nature from all earlier, from what we could call non-scientific conceptions! The crux of the method lies in its insistence that every observable bodily motion or state shall be understood by way of other observable bodily motions or states occurring outside the body studied. This principle says nothing about the nature of the relations connecting the motions of the bodies. These relations are specific, and await discovery. Yet it carries a very important implication which I think has never been made sufficiently explicit. This is that in using this method, you never explain only one thing at a time. The analysis of the body studied is always an analysis of the bodies affecting it. This means that the method involves an analysis of the effective environment of a thing simultaneously with the analysis of the thing itself, the two analyses being one, and body and environment being explained in terms of each other. This is what distinguishes modern science, and what should dis-

tinguish modern philosophy in general, from the earlier thought which explained the behavior of a thing in terms of its own inner nature as determined by the cosmic whole. It explains why Descartes postulated a mechanical universe; for if mechanical analysis was to proceed, and not be brought up sharp against an insuperable barrier, it must postulate that each new environment in turn, as far as space extends, is mechanically related to the last. We may call this postulate the principle of congruity, since it requires a likeness of structure between the behavior of a body and the external conditions affecting it; and we see that the principle is maintained in each division of physical analysis, as well as in physical analysis in general. Thus chemistry postulates a world of chemical reagents, the analysis of the agent being no less an analysis of the reagent; mechanics postulates a world of mechanically stable bodies, geometry a world of contiguous geometrical forms, optics a world of geometrically related light-lanes, thermics a world of temperature-gradients, and so forth. Thus physics really postulates a dozen different worlds, rather than one. The principle of congruity, which constitutes the method differentiating modern dynamic science from all other analysis, is independent of the nature of the motion studied, that is to say, of the content of the particular science illustrating it.

Now let us apply what we have learned from this historical retrospect to the study of organic behavior. The organism is a thing, rotated and translated, bent and twisted in space by the insurgence upon it of forces originating in locable bodies outside of it. We recognize it as an organism by the distinctive forms of this motion, just as we distinguish a solid from a liquid, or a sound-wave from a cyclone. The organism is, of course, a chemical complex, too, but when we see it as such we are abstracting from its distinctive organic character. In the same way a stone is a chemical complex if we abstract from the macroscopic mechanical character belonging to it as a body which moves as a unit. To initiate a modern dynamic science of biology, we must accordingly postulate an environment congruous with and responsible for the distinctively organic character of the organic behavior. As Descartes was driven to postulate a mechanical universe, so we are driven to postulate a biotic universe, congruous with the organic motion. This the biologist has never been willing or able to do. He is willing to restore the organism itself to nature, but he leaves it naked and homeless in a physical world. He refuses to postulate in the environment the effective presence of those things, those energies, those forms which alone can intelligibly affect and effect the distinctively organic motion of a living body. He is forced, in consequence, to disbelieve the evidence of his eyes. It looks, he thinks, as if the organism moved

peculiarly, differently from inorganic bodies; but that must be an illusion of the senses; for if the organism responds to a physical environment, its response must be physical in kind. And having reached this conclusion, he will again point to the metabolism, the self-reproduction, the sensitivity, etc., which make the organism different from physical bodies; and he throws up his hands in despair. But we can see that the biologist has violated the first principle of dynamic science, and is himself responsible for his failure.

He has failed to apply the principle of congruity, he has not postulated a biotic environment structurally continuous with the observable organic movement; and the consequences of this omission are disastrous. Instead of pursuing a genuinely *causal* analysis of organic motion, the biologist attempts a merely *casual* dissection of the organic matter into members, tissues, cells, chromosomes, or other entities visible to the aided or unaided eye. In place of the analysis of the environment which should supplement the analysis of the organism, the biologist offers us nothing, referring us instead to the analysis of the physicist—an analysis which is quite irrelevant to strictly biological study, since the physicist has been religiously careful to analyse the environment exclusively in terms of its effect upon inorganic bodies. Ultimately the biologist is driven to some form of vitalism, a doctrine which is nothing more than a revival of that scholastic pseudo-science which modern physics has forever invalidated. All modern biologists, however violently they may deny the allegation, are vitalists in practice; for their practice invariably assumes that the organism may be intelligibly affected from within, but never from outside itself. Some of them are even beginning to talk about the "internal" environment, which being translated means the "inside outside" of the organism—a nice way indeed to get rid of the basic problem of biology, which is the relation of the organism to its external surroundings. It should be said, however, that all our orthodox philosophy is the accomplice of the biologist in this obscurantism. It has done nothing to help him, but opposes and impedes the rise of an autonomous biology exactly as the scholastic philosophy opposed and impeded the advance of an autonomous physics. It does this by perpetuating a conception of the human organism that is grounded in scholastic dogma, as was shown earlier in this paper, and by explicitly offering to the biologist an organismic metaphysic as a rationale for his vitalistic practice. The biologist is told that all natural units, atoms and molecules as well as living creatures, are organisms, acting as wholes and thereby determining their own behavior; so that he need not hesitate to think of the living organism as similarly determining itself from within. All this is plain misuse of language. Atoms

and molecules are in some respects natural units; but organisms they are not, nor do they determine their own behavior in any way. Their whole behavior is responsive to determinate external conditions, and all that is meant by saying that they are natural units is that when they respond to external conditions, they do so as atoms, say, of copper or molecules of chalk, and not like a cow or the Prince of Wales.

The word "organism" really refers us to the distinctive behavior of living creatures, and no one has the slightest right to apply it to anything else. Let us hope that only logicians, and no scientists, are capable of converting "All organisms are natural units" into "All natural units are organisms." It should be noted that the units of modern science, such as atoms, electric charges, or organisms, are unitary in two respects—first as unitary types, then as unitary individuals; but in both respects the unitary character signifies a permanence or integrity in their response to external changes, and so refers us to some unitary pattern in the environment. The atom can be broken up, which means that there are environmental patterns careless of or incompatible with the atomic unity; but we are justified in calling the atom a unit if in certain determinate respects, i.e., in its response to certain environmental sets, it acts as an integer. So with the organism, which responds to many environmental patterns in its organic character, but fails to respond so, and dies, when subjected to others. Our study is to learn the environmental patterns stimulating the organism to greater life, or compelling it to death. The environment rules in intelligible ways over life and death, health and disease.

At this point we should notice several praiseworthy attempts of recent years to establish a genuinely scientific biology, by insisting upon the dynamic continuity of organism and environment. One of these is biophysics; but since this mode of analysis abstracts from the distinctively organic characters of living behavior, it is truly a branch of physics and not of biology. A second is behaviorism. This study starts out well in its postulation of an exhaustive correspondence between organic motion and environmental pattern; but it has succeeded thus far only in the correlation of some reflex motions to their stimuli, and very soon proceeds to the quite unscientific concept of a reflex conditioned by a private history. A third attempt is Gestalt-psychology, which conceives of organism and environment as the abstracted factors of a dynamic field, to be understood by analogy with electrical phenomena. Gestalt-psychology, influenced by certain realistic theories of perception, has overshot the mark. In order to establish the continuity of the organism with the environment, it has postulated their identity, and

ignored their differences. A fourth attempt, once more carried into the field of human behavior, is psycho-analysis, which shows how certain dominant and typical momenta in human behavior are shaped in the individual by the immediate social environment. This would seem to be genuinely dynamic method; but the value of the particular hypotheses so far advanced is open to question.

These theories, however, for all their brave attempt to understand organic behavior as the correlate of an environmental structure, still labor under the incubus of the old Cartesian dogma which denies the relevance of the non-living environment to the distinctive and observable motions of living being. This dogma it is which prevents the behaviorist from perceiving in the environment anything more than the immediate physical occasion of the momentary organic response; which limits the Gestalt-psychologist to a psycho-physical parallelism and to a survey of sensible perception; which allows the psycho-analyst to regard as real only the animal instincts, all the distinctively human behavior being explained away as a subjective sublimation of these drives—a return, be it noted, to the conditioned reflex of the behaviorist; and it is this dogma which, of course, leads the bio-physicist to ignore the movement of the organism in its proper character. We must break with the whole post-Cartesian metaphysic, and not only with nineteenth-century psychology, if we are to perceive the basic connection between organism and environment. We must know that all the basic rhythms of organic life, such as breathing, hunger, thirst, sex, sleeping and waking, action and repose, sociability and its opposite, growth and decay, appearance and disappearance of species, rise and decline of cultural forms, war and peace, are the expression of organic periodicities as effectively controlled by prevailing environmental constants as is the swing of a pendulum! It is these great periodicities which control, under the flotsam and jetsam of our individual response and immediate perception, the tides of human behavior; and until we know something of them, both introspection and laboratory experimentation are a meaningless waste of time. It is to the largest, most general, and most constant characters of organic behavior that we must look for our first clues to the environmental patterns determining living behavior; and all our effort so far has begun at the wrong end. We are not afraid to attribute the motion of the pendulum to the action upon the latter of the whole earth. Why then should we fear to search in this larger environment for the conditions of the pendulum-like periodicities of the organism! Is it not apparent that sleeping and waking are accommodated to the diurnal rhythm, and sex to the seasonal rhythm? Sun and earth are participant, as the ancients so well knew, in the organic process;

and if so, we must attribute to them a biotic character intelligible to us at present only in these, their observable effects on terrestrial organisms. We must seek to understand the solar system and the organisms about us in terms of each other, in obedience to the scientific principle of congruity. It is patent to all of us that the movement of life on this planet has conditioned climate and erosion, and thereby the topography of ocean and mountain-chain. Why then do we hesitate to draw the implications of this fact, which is the scientific necessity of understanding terrestrial structure in terms of a distinctively organic growth?

I have said enough perhaps to indicate the nature of the metaphysic which must replace our Cartesianism, if the sciences of life are to be given the foundation they need. Many decades, possibly some centuries, will be needed to free our minds completely from the dogma and sophistication now obstructing thought, and to open our eyes to the full diversity and structural integrity of the biotic dimension of nature. This biotic conception, it may be emphasized, carries no reflection upon the physical conception, which is recognized to be valid but refused as an exhaustive analysis of natural structure. But the biotic conception, I am aware, must remain somewhat of an esoteric doctrine until it has delivered itself of its burden, which is a detailed reconstruction of the visible movements of the organisms known to us; by which time it will have been stereotyped into something it is not, and become in its turn a dogma of the vulgar. But we are busy bringing the conception to birth, and need not be too much concerned about its mortality.

To this work then I call all philosophers who, whatever their age as measured by the planets, are young in spirit and intelligence, and who in their hearts are prescient of the sterility and the anachronism of what passes for philosophy today. We shall do for the sciences of life what Descartes did for the sciences of physical structure! Is that not more worth while than another pseudo-psychology of perception? We shall postulate this biotic universe as the background suggesting hypothesis and controlling analysis in our study of the smaller visible movements of organic life. Do not despise the conception because it is simple—this is its token of truth, and it will lead to reflections intricate enough for the logician to pore over and confuse. If it does not immediately inspire some large volume studiously transposing into a new terminology the accumulated refuse of the past, remember that all the important books have been little books, that a fragment of one Platonic dialogue, conserved through the Middle Ages, undid all the tomes of Aristotle and his commentators; and that Socrates, having written nothing, had a civilization writing for him! And if the concept seems vague,

remember that it is the business of thought to make vague concepts clear, and not to turn concepts already clear upside down and inside out!

But while our immediate business is perhaps the entertainment and extension to others of this biotic conception of nature, we should ourselves begin its application to the particular data of biology as they now exist. We might do best perhaps to consider first the interactions within our own species, where the congruity between action and reaction is most apparent to us, since both parties to the transaction are at once animal and human. What are the biotic forces holding together or forcing apart the members of human groups? But it is evident that we shall not proceed far with this analysis without calling upon both infra-social and ultra-social forces or relations. The human process overlaps the vegetable and the animal processes, and overlaps also, we have it on excellent authority, those processes our fathers in their ignorance called divine. For an understanding of the infra-social processes we should surely turn to the animals themselves, not forgetting that in our social development we have sacrificed something of animal genius. The animals then we shall seek to understand not in their visible morphology, but in their visible interactions with members of their own and other species. We shall proceed in the opposite direction from the biology of the past, from function to stuff instead of from stuff to function. We shall note how the whole animal world is ultimately parasitic to the vegetable, and determined in its functions by this relationship. We shall note how in each case the animal function moulds itself upon the behavior of other animals and plants. But again, as we proceed in this way, we shall be led to consider the prior process, in this case vegetative, embodied in modified form in the animal reaction. Thus hunger relates the animal to animal or plant, but thirst relates it to the inorganic environment. Thirst is essentially a vegetative response; the root creeps towards water, the animal walks towards water. Thirst relates the organism to a biotic complex of river and lake, snow and rain, climate and topography. Terrestrial nature hides forms relevant to organic growth, and intelligible only in terms of this growth.

As our biotic reconstruction proceeds, we shall find ourselves learning our philosophy over again, in ways that reveal its true significance. What was the whole scholastic hierarchy, for example, but a rather absurdly foreshortened snapshot of the genetic movement of the species of life on this planet. What was Plato's Idea but a rather literary allusion to the biotic pattern of universal nature, in its distinction from the more mechanistic structure discovered by terrestrial physics? The age-old problems of philosophy

will take their place in a context allowing some degree of solution. Our animal perception, for example, we shall understand as a fragment or cross-section of the time-taking biotic reactions of metabolism, reproduction, and the like; for the most basic processes of animal life existed before the senses were sharpened by differentiated end-organs. We shall understand the basic philosophical problem to be the problem of human health, in the largest meaning of these words; and we shall solve the problem by distinguishing the biotic patterns which at any time stimulate to motions issuing in madness and death from those which stimulate to integrity and growth. We shall understand what science means as a response to nature, as well as what it means as a description of nature. We shall know the diversity of man and the diversity of nature in terms of each other. There will be some sense then in studying the relation of physical science to its object, the world.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Studies in the Platonic Epistles. GLENN R. MORROW. (Illinois Studies in Language and Literature, XVIII, 3–4, University of Illinois Bulletin, XXXII, 43.) Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois. 1935. 234 pp. $3.00.

The bulk of this work is devoted to studies of various problems concerning the Epistles; but there is also a complete translation of the Epistles themselves with notes. The question of authenticity in general is dealt with in the first chapter; but in addition, the authenticity of each Epistle is taken up in a separate chapter or a note. The author, who handles the evidence very well, takes the position that some of the letters are certainly spurious, some doubtful, and some genuine. One of the genuine class is VII, and there is an illuminating chapter on the theory of knowledge in this letter. Also, the picture of Plato facing the concrete perplexities of actual existence in Athens and Syracuse is extremely well drawn, and deserves to be read as a companion piece to the political philosophy of the Dialogues. The author does not adopt any clear-cut position with regard to the question of development in Plato's views; but in several places he draws attention to the fact that both the style and the ideas of the Epistles agree best with the last group of Dialogues, with which they were contemporary. The text used for the translation is Burnet's, and the rendering is smooth and unusually clear. The notes do not pretend to be an adequate consideration of all the

phrases in the text that have given rise to scholarly interpretation, but they are sufficient for all but the most expert understanding.

R. S.

Kant und die Ethik der Griechen. KLAUS REICH. (Philosophie und Geschichte, No. 56.) Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). 1935. 48 pp. M 1.50 less 25%.

To what extent was Kant influenced by Plato and the Stoics in developing and formulating his moral philosophy? This is the interesting question which Dr. Reich attempts to answer. The investigation falls into two parts, one, Kant's indebtedness to Platonic idealism, and two, his treatment of certain basic ideas of Panaetius of Rhodes, as found in Cicero's *De officiis.* Some of Kant's writings of his earlier and middle periods are examined in an attempt to discover when and how he arrived at the conviction that a moral principle, to be valid, must be strictly *a priori,* independent of empirical considerations. Evidence is offered to show that Kant read Moses Mendelssohn's *Phädon oder über die Unsterblich Keit der Seele* (1767), a work which contained a sufficiently adequate translation of the *Phaedo* to enable Kant to get at Plato's doctrine of rational insight into moral value. The author concludes that Kant was powerfully influenced by this Platonic repudiation of ethical empiricism and by Plato's constructive moral insight. Kant's formulations of the Categorical Imperative in his *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals* are next examined; evidence that he was conversant with Stoic doctrine as expounded by Cicero is marshalled; and the conclusion is reached that once again Kant was significantly influenced by the Ciceronian analysis of morality, though here his response was more critical than sympathetic. The final paragraph (in somewhat free translation) reads as follows:

> While Kant was concerning himself with the Wolffian-Stoic and the English moral philosophy, he made use of Plato's special contribution to the principles of morality to combat and correct the moral doctrine of the Stoa (Panaetius). Plato had, indeed, no principle of the autonomy of the will. But when, later, the philosophy of the Stoics had systematized morality, a spark from the fire of the Platonic Ideas, cast into this popular moral philosophy of the Stoics—a philosophy which Kant studied (*folgte*), together with the English doctrine—kindled in Kant the burning idea of the autonomy of the will. It was this idea which refined the ore of the Stoic doctrine into pure gold.

The author's thesis is worthy of consideration, but his treatment of it, though at times illuminating, suffers from brevity and one-sidedness. The examination of pertinent Kantian writings is not exhaustive (the "Religion innerhalb . . .," for instance, is not even mentioned) and no real attempt is made to appraise the relative importance of the Greek influence on Kant as against the influence, say,

of German Pietism. The monograph is thus more a case of special pleading than of strictly impartial inquiry. Even so it has real value in emphasizing a commonly neglected approach to Kant's ethical theory.

T. M. G.

Evolution of Hindu Moral Ideals. Sir P. S. Sivaswamy Aiyer. (Kamala Lectures.) Calcutta: The Calcutta University. 1935. Pp. xix + 242. 4/6.

Sir Sivaswamy addresses himself to two classes of persons: (1) the Sanātanists who hold that the principles of the *Dharma Shastras* are eternal and immutable; and (2) the Christian critics who hold that social progress in India has been retarded by the essential principles of Hinduism. In answering the former, the author appeals to the internal evidence of the *Shastras* themselves, and, as he surveys the scriptures in a chronological sequence, shows the whole gamut of moral ideals and practices in a state of perpetual change. Under present-day conditions it is even accelerated; and caste, marriage, condition of women, property, are all coming in for new or modified treatment. While he is a little nervous about the outcome, especially as regards women with their new freedom, still, the author has no illusions as to the fact of changing ethical ideals. In meeting the criticisms which Christians direct against Hinduism the lecturer endeavors to show that there is not very much difference after all between Hindu and Christian moral ideals. Hindu pessimism is ultimately not so gloomy as it appears; and besides, the books are given to rhetorical exaggeration on this point. Both systems are agreed in emphasis upon negative virtues, blameless life and quietism. The author modifies the *Gītā* doctrine on non-attachment to mean not *undue* attachment to the Hindu aims of virtue, wealth, pleasure, and release. Although there is an overwhelming predominance of ritualism in Hinduism and repression of individual initiative due to caste organization, still there are ways out of this situation. Furthermore, he argues for the superiority of the Hindu system in its ideas of *karma,* self-discipline, *ahimsa,* toleration, freedom of thought, the stressing of obligations rather than of rights, and the doctrine of relativity with reference to capacity, qualifications, and conditions in relation to moral ends and rules of conduct. The lectures throw light upon a number of problems and show how a thoughtful Hindu views contemporary India. His treatment is clear and free from intricate discussions. Two comments may be offered. When dealing with Hindu moral ideals and their evolution, Sir Sivaswamy is occupied with commensurate terms and attitudes and his conclusions may be accepted. On the other hand, when

he places Hindu ideals over against those of Christianity, he seems content to accept superficial similarities between the two, rather than to go into the more profound differences which lie below the surface. Such terms as *karma* and *ahimsa,* for example, have distinctive histories and significance. No satisfactory comparative evaluation can be arrived at until adequate place is made for differences between the two groups of moral ideals.

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Bolschewismus als Weltgefahr. WALDEMAR GURIAN. Lucerne: Vita Nova. 1935. Pp. 105. 3 fr., 2.40 R.M.

This political tract contends that National Socialism, the brown conspiracy, is a mere imitation and refinement of Bolshevism, the red conspiracy; and that it is especially attractive and dangerous to Western Europe because of its subtler methods, its insistence on order, and in general, its adaptability to cultured nations in the Post-War Period. "The Russian, or Oriental form of Bolshevism" is not so dangerous since it has been discredited by its crude despotism, its terror and regimentation, and its economic failure. To do the author justice, he is not so imprudent as to attempt a scientific defense of his numerous, gross disparagements of the U. S. S. R., and confines himself, for the most part, to ingenious but, in the opinion of this reviewer, very shallow parallels between "the two types of Bolshevism." This theory of the close similarity of Bolshevism and National Socialism had its origin in the attitude of the leaders of Social Democracy in pre-Hitler Germany (Wels, Noske, Scheidemann, Severing, etc.). Arguing, apparently, from the principle that two things opposed to the same thing are equal to each other, they could conclude that two movements, since they both opposed Weimar, were much the same.

V. J. McG.

OTHER NEW BOOKS AND JOURNALS

Chang, T. S.: Epistemological Pluralism. Translated with the Collaboration of the author by C. Y. Chang. Shanghai: Privately printed. vi + 54 pp.

Maeterlinck, Maurice: The Supreme Law. Translated by K. S. Shelvankar. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc. 1935. 160 pp. $2.00.

THE AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY. Vol. XIII, No. 3. What is the Value of Woodworth's Psychology?

H. B. Loughnan. Modality: *P. H. Partridge.* Notes on Aesthetics: *R. P. Anschutz.* University Reform: *John Anderson.* Discussion—The Logic of Relativity: *H. C. Corben.* Researches and Reports—The Relation of Ascendance-Submission Tendencies to Neurosis: *Freda Farram.* An Association Scale? *H. H. Ferguson.*

THE PHILOSOPHER. Vol. XIII, No. 4. In Defence of Values (Editorial). The Philosophy of History: *J. W. Scott.* The Principles of Good Life: *W. P. Montague.* The Fall as a Philosophical Principle: *J. M. Henry.* The Rationalism of Maimonides: *A. Wolf.* The Wisdom of Lao-Tzu: *Jessie Field.*

ARCHIVIO DI FILOSOFIA. Anno V, Fasc. III. Idee e concetti—L'idea di Dio: *F. Arestano.* Il mondo morale: *U. Redanò.* Forme di esistenza e forme di conoscenza: *V. Bertolino.* Statuto della Società Filosofica Italiana.

NOTES AND NEWS

The University of Southern California will celebrate its twenty-fifth anniversary of the inauguration of graduate studies with a three-day conference, beginning November 21, 1935, on research and graduate work in the fields of science and education, under the chairmanship of Dr. Rockwell D. Hunt, director of the University of Southern California graduate school. Prominent educators from outstanding institutions of the country will take part in the panel discussions. "Social Application of Academic Scholarship" will be the theme of the celebration.

Included among the guest speakers will be: Dr. George F. Zook, president of the American Council on Education at Washington, D. C. and former president of the University of Akron; Dr. Carl Emil Seashore, dean of the Graduate College, University of Iowa; Dr. E. O. Mendenhall, president of Whittier College; Dr. Christine Galitzi of Scripps College, who has served on the Rumanian cabinet and at the request of the League of Nations has represented Greece in special departmentals. Other sections of the conference will include Dr. E. W. Tolman, University of California, and Dr. C. P. Stone of Stanford University. Dr. R. B. van Kleinsmid, president of the Trojan institution, will address the session.

There will be group conferences in the fields of the social sciences, languages and literature, education, psychology, the physical sciences, mathematics, biology and the medical sciences, philosophy, history, and international relations.